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Inheritance and the lliegitimate: A Model 
for Probate Reform 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 20, 1968, the United States Supreme Court handed 
down landmark decisions in Levy v. Louisiana1 and Glona v. Amer-
ican Guarantee 6- Liability Insurance Company.2 In Levy, five ille-
gitimate children sued under article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil 
Code3 for damages for the wrongful death of their mother. The 
suit was dismissed by the Louisiana district court, which held that 
illegitimate children had no cause of action under the Louisiana 
statute. In Glona, a Texas domiciliary brought a diversity action 
in federal district court in Texas for the wrongful death of her 
illegitimate son, caused by an automobile accident in Louisiana. 
The Texas district court dismissed the suit, holding that under 
Louisiana law the mother had no cause of action for the death 
of her illegitimate child. The Supreme Court granted the petition 
for certiorari in Glona4 and noted probable jurisdiction in Levy.5 
With Justice Douglas ·writing for a majority of six in each case,6 
the Court reversed both decisions, holding that the Louisiana 
wrongful-death statute denied equal protection of the law both 
to illegitimate children and to their parents. 
Levy and Glona, read narrowly, stand only for the proposition 
that a state wrongful-death statute cannot discriminate between 
beneficiaries solely on the basis of legitimacy. Read in their broad-
est sense, however, the opinions in the two cases condemn generally 
any classification based on legitimacy. A major problem with the 
opinions is that Justice Douglas did not specify the grounds on 
which he based his decision. Thus, the potential scope of the hold-
ings is open to question. Several recent cases7 have interpreted 
Levy to condemn all classifications based on legitimacy. Similarly, 
I. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
2. 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
3. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1969). 
4. 389 U.S. 969 (1967). 
5. 389 U.S. 925 (1967). 
6. Justices Black and Stewart joined Justice Harlan, dissenting, in both cases. 391 
U.S. at 76. 
7. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), especially Justice Douglas, concurring, at 
392 U.S. at 336 (AFDC payments); Munn v. Munn, 450 P.2d 68 (Colo. 1969) (support); 
R-v. R-, 431 S.W .2d 152 (Mo. 1968) (support); In re Estate of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 
861 (N.D. 1968) (inheritance). But see Straban v. Straban, 304 F. Supp. 40 (W.D. La. 
1969) (inheritance). · 
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several commentators have argued persuasively that the Levy rea-
soning should be extended, by a test of "close scrutiny" under the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,8 to areas 
of the law other than wrongful death and should be extended 
with equal force to the child-father relationship as well as the 
child-mother relationship. 9 
One area of the law in which there traditionally has been dis-
crimination against the illegitimate is that of inheritance. While 
most states allow an illegitimate to inherit from his mother by 
intestate succession on an equal footing with legitimate offspring,1° 
only three states11 allow an illegitimate to inherit from the father 
equally with legitimate offspring. Rather, most states require the 
father formally to recognize or acknowledge his illegitimate off-
spring in order for the child to be able to inherit from the father 
by intestacy.12 In a few other states a judgment in a paternity 
action gives the illegitimate child the right to inherit from his 
father.13 Not all states allow illegitimates to inherit from the 
mother's family, and only a few allow them to inherit from the 
8. The courts tend to apply a close-scrutiny test over classifications when the 
interests at stake are deemed fundamental (see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting) and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right of 
the criminally accused to a proper defense)), or when the classification involved is 
inherently suspect (see Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (race)). 
9. The general consensus among the commentators seems to be that either a 
close-scrutiny test should be applied or, in any event, the traditional state interests 
in supporting discrimination against illegitimates-to encourage marriage, to dis-
courage promiscuity, and so forth-should no longer be considered "rational." See 
generally Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477 
(1967); Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-First 
Decisions on Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 338 (1969); Gray &: 
Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. 
American Guarantee b Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REv. I (1969); Comment, 
The Expanding Rights of the Illegitimate, 3 CREIGHTON L. REv. 135 (1970); Note, 
Equal Protection and the Applicability of Levy v. Louisiana to Succession Law, 44 TuL. 
L. REV. 640 (1970); Note, Inheritance Rights of Illegitimate Children Under the Equal 
Protection Clause, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1336 (1970); Recent Development, 21 CASE W. REs. 
L. REv. 292 (1970). 
IO. See Note, Illegitimacy, 26 BROOKLYN L. REv. 45, 76-79 (1959). 
11. Arizona, North Dakota, and Oregon have abolished illegitimacy as a legal status. 
See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-206 (1956) ("A. Every child is the legitimate child of 
its natural parents .••• B. Every child shall inherit from its natural parents and from 
their kindred heir, lineal and collateral, in the same manner as children born in 
lawful wedlock .••• "); N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-05 (Supp. 1969) f'Every child is hereby 
declared to be the legitimate child of his natural parents. • • • He shall inherit from 
his natural parents, and from their kindred heir, lineal and collateral. • • .'); ORE. 
REV. STAT. § 109.060 (1968) ("The legal status and legal relationships and the rights 
and obligations between a person and his descendants, and between a person and his 
parents, their descendants and kindred, are the same for all persons, whether or not 
the parents have been married.'). 
12. See Note, Illegitimacy, 26 BROOKLYN L. REV. 45, 76-79 (1959). 
13. Id. 
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father's family.14 Furthermore, when a testator makes a bequest 
to his "children" in a will, many states have construed that term 
to include only legitimate children.115 Thus, most states discrimi-
nate against illegitimates in their inheritance laws, although there 
are local variations concerning the manner and extent of the dis-
crimination. 
In light of Levy and Glona, and their progeny, the state in-
heritance statutes that discriminate on the basis of legitimacy are 
of dubious constitutionality.16 Moreover, there has been over the 
past decade a perceptible trend in state and federal laws to bring 
the illegitimate child into a position of parity with his legitimate 
counterpart with regard to various legal rights.17 Furthermore, 
commentators such as Norman Dacey18 have soundly criticized 
probate laws on various grounds, and have exerted discernible 
pressure for a reform of probate law into a system more responsive 
to present-day needs. In light of these developments, therefore, 
it is likely that many states will be revising their inheritance 
statutes to provide illegitimates with certain legal rights that com-
pare favorably with those accorded legitimate offspring. 
The Uniform Probate Code (Code),19 which was approved by 
the American Bar Association in August 1969, deals with the prob-
14. Id. 
15. See Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 4 (1954) (Right of Illegitimate Child To Take Under 
Testamentary Gift to "Children"). 
16. The commentators have painstakingly explored the constitutional issues involved. 
See sources cited at note 9 supra. In general, the consensus seems to be that while the 
right to inherit by intestacy-being a matter of statutory grace-is probably not a 
basic civil right, any classification based on legitimacy is probably inherently suspect-
just as is a classification based on race. Thus the strict test of close scrutiny under 
the equal protection clause should apply. See note 8 supra. Furthermore, myths of a 
"rational purpose" (for a statement of the rational-purpose or reasonable-basis test 
of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment, see Lindsley v. Natural 
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911)) to support discrimination against illegitimates-
discouraging promiscuity, preserving the family unit, promoting morality-have been 
largely exploded by the same commentators. On the other hand, a federal district court 
in Strahan v. Strahan, 304 F. Supp. 40 (W.D. La. 1969), recently held Louisiana's 
intestacy statute, which denies to unacknowledged illegitimates the rights of inheri-
tance enjoyed by legitimate issue of an intestate decedent, to be reasonable under the 
rationality test of the equal protection clause-the test that the court felt was 
applicable. The court identified two rationales sufficient to justify the statutory 
discrimination: (1) encouraging marriage and discouraging promiscuity, and (2) Louisi-
ana's interest in maintaining stability of land titles. 304 F. Supp. at 42. The Strahan 
decision is criticized in Comment, The Expanding Rights of the Illegitimate, 3 
CREIGHTON L. REv. 135, 155 (1970); Note, Equal Protection and the Applicability of 
Levy v. Louisiana to Succession Law, 44 TuL. L. REv. 640, 642 (1970); Recent Develop-
ment, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 292, 293-94 (1970). 
17. E.g., Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 852.05 (Supp. 1970), and official comment. See Note, 
The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 HARV. L. REv. 337 (1962). 
18. See, e.g., N. DACEY, How To Avom PROBATE (1966). 
19. The Uniform Probate Code [hereinafter UPC] was promulgated by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and approved by the House of 
Delegates of the American Bar Association in August 1969. 
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lem of inheritance by illegitimates both with regard to intestate 
succession-section 2-109-and also with regard to the construction 
of a bequest to "children" by will-section 2-611. This Note will 
examine the issue whether the Code, which presents a comprehensive 
model for probate reform, deals with the problem of inheritance by 
illegitimates in an appropriate, desirable, and constitutional man-
ner. The Code provisions concerning illegitimacy relate to many 
other provisions of the Code in which childhood status is relevant;20 
therefore, it will be useful to analyze these other provisions in order 
to assess the over-all effect of section 2-109 and section 2-611 in an 
integrated probate system. On the other hand, the formulae set out 
in sections 2-109 and 2-611, if constitutional, could constitute a 
desirable model for probate reform-even apart from the entire re-
form package of the Code-for those states that wish to, or, indeed, 
who are forced to, reform their laws in this important area. 
II. THE ILLEGITIMATE AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION 
UNDER THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
A. Section 2-109 
I. Meaning 
Article 2 of the Code deals with intestate succession and wills. 
Under that article, section 2-109 defines "child" for the purpose of 
intestate succession. Furthermore, since section 1-201, the general 
definitional section of the Code, adopts the section 2-109 definition 
of "child," that definition is established for all purposes throughout 
the Code.21 Section 2-109 provides: 
If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent 
and child must be established to determine succession by, through, or 
from a person, 
(I) an adopted person is the child of an adopting parent and not 
of the natural parents except that adoption of a child by the spouse 
of a natural parent has no effect on the relationship between the child 
and that natural parent. 
(2) In cases not covered by (1), a person born out of wedlock is a 
child of the mother. That person is also a child of the father, if: 
(i) the natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony 
before or after the birth of the child, even though the attempted 
marriage is void; or 
(ii) the paternity is established by an adjudication before the 
death of the father, or is established thereafter by clear and con-
20. See pt. II. B. infra. 
21. UPC § 1-201(3) provides: "'Child' includes any individual entitled to take as a 
child under this Code by intestate succession from the parent whose relationship is 
involved and excludes any person who is only a stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild 
or any more remote descendant." 
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vincing proof, except that the paternity established under this 
subparagraph (ii) is ineffective to qualify the father or his kindred 
to inherit from or through the child unless the father has openly 
treated the child as his, and has not refused to support the child. 
The language of the statute seems to be clear for the most 
part, but there may be an ambiguity that could best be dealt with 
in a comment to the statutory language. Subsection (2) is intended 
to define the right of an illegitimate who is not subsequently 
adopted under subsection (1) to inherit by intestacy. Such a per-
son is always the "child" of the mother, and is also the "child" 
of the father if he is legitimated by the marriage of his natural 
parents or if he or his mother can establish the identity of the 
natural father to the satisfaction of subparagraph (2)(ii) of the 
section. Although the language of subsection (2) seems to be clear 
on its face, it appears to contain a latent ambiguity in that sub-
paragraph (2)(i) runs headlong into "one of the strongest pre-
sumptions" in this area of the law-the presumption of legitimacy.22 
This doctrine, which derives from English law23 and which is very 
common in American jurisdictions,24 raises a strong presumption, 
usually rebuttable only by proof of impotency or nonaccess, that 
any child born in wedlock is legitimate.25 The presumption is an 
outgrowth of the time when bastardy was not only a source of re-
proach and ridicule, but also a source of grave material and legal 
disadvantage. Although the stigmas attached to bastardy, both per-
sonal and legal, have gradually dissipated somewhat over the years, 
the presumption has remained.26 The source of the crucial ambiguity 
lies in the fact that the term "wedlock" is used in a more narrow 
sense in the Code than it is in the presumption of legitimacy. 
It seems clear from a reading of section 2-109 that the policy 
of that section is to enable illegitimates to inherit from their 
natural parents-hence "wedlock" is intended to mean marriage 
between the natural parents of a child. The policy of the presump-
tion of legitimacy, however, is to avoid bastardization of as many 
children as possible-hence "wedlock" simply means any marriage 
at all. Accordingly, the presumption has been held to override 
an acknowledgment by the true father from an adulterous relation-
ship when there was no clear proof of nonaccess or impotence of 
the legal husband.27 Therefore, since the policy of section 2-109 
22. See Lanford v. Lanford, 151 Colo. 273, 377 P.2d 115 (1962). 
23. Banbury Peerage Case, 1 Sim. &: St. 153, 57 Eng. Rep. 62 (Ch. 1811). 
24. See, e.g., Lanford v. Lanford, 151 Colo. 273, 377 P.2d 115 (1962); Ellis v. Woods, 
214 Ga. 105, 103 S.E.2d 297 (1958). 
25. See, e.g., Gravely v. Gravely, 353 S.W .2d 333 (Tex. 1961). 
26. See v. SAARIO, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK 
143-47 (1967). 
27. Reyes v. Flemming, 168 F. Supp. 566 (D.P.R. 1958); George v. Bertrand, 217 
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dictates that "wedlock" means marriage only between the natural 
parents, that interpretation should be made explicit either in 
the statute or in a comment to that section, and the presumption 
of legitimacy should be similarly limited in those jurisdictions 
that may adopt the Code formulation of section 2-109. 
2. Constitutionality 
Assuming that section 2-109 can be read literally, subject to 
the above qualifications, it must, of course, pass the test of the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment in order 
to be valid. While Justice Douglas did not clearly specify the 
equal protection test which he applied in Levy and Glona,28 it 
appears that section 2-109 would be valid vis-a-vis inheritance 
by illegitimate children under either the rationality test29-the 
basic test of equal protection-or under the close-scrutiny test30-
the test applied when a basic civil right or an inherently suspect 
classification is involved.31 The provision would be valid for the 
simple reason that it makes no classification on the basis of il-
legitimacy. Section 2-109(1) makes no distinction whatever between 
legitimates and illegitimates, and section 2-109(2) merely estab-
lishes a burden of proof32 of paternity in the child-father relation-
ship which the illegitimate must meet before he can inherit from 
his natural father. Substantively, section 2-109(2) takes the position 
that all children have the right to inherit equally from their 
natural parents. The draftsmen of the provision recognized, how-
ever, that while there are few, if any, problems of proof in 
ascertaining the child-mother relationship, such problems may be 
substantial indeed in ascertaining the child-father relationship. 
Thus, section 2-109(2)(ii) sets out a standard of proof for the ille-
gitimate or his next friend to meet in establishing paternity if it 
has not been established by adoption under subparagraph (1). By 
imposing a burden of proof, then, section 2-109(2) does not entail 
a classification that must pass muster before the appropriate equal 
protection test, but rather, it entails a standard that must be mea-
sured by due process considerations. 
S.2d 47 (Ct. App. La. 1968), writ of review denied, 253 La. 647, 219 S.2d 177, cert. de-
nied, 396 U.S. 974 (1969). 
28. See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra. 
29. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1956). See also note 16 supra. 
30. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 
633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See also note 8 supra. 
31. Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 9, at 15, suggest that perhaps the Court in L~y 
and Glona has taken a middle ground between the rationality and strict-scrutiny tests. 
32. In Glona, Justice Douglas suggested that the danger of fraudulent claims is 
properly handled by an appropriate burden of proof rather than by making a 
classification which amounts to a denial of equal protection. 391 U.S. at 75-76. 
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One of the prime purposes of imposing a burden-of-proof re-
quirement is to prevent fraudulent claims.33 So stated, such a re-
quirement certainly serves a valid state purpose. However, if the 
burden imposed is too heavy-that is, if it is tantamount to a bar 
to recovery in a substantial number of cases-it may operate as 
a deprivation of property without due process of law on those un-
able to meet the unreasonable burden.34 It does not appear, how-
ever, that the standard adopted in section 2-109(2)(ii) is so onerous 
as to be violative of due process. If the only means of establishing 
paternity were by an adjudication before the death of the father, 
the standard would be of doubtful validity since the illegitimate's 
legal rights would be determined by the volitional acts of other 
people-the father by acknowledgment, or the mother by prose-
cuting a paternity suit. By allowing clear and convincing proof 
of paternity after the father's death, however, the statute, unlike 
many of the present provisions requiring acknowledgment by the 
father while he is alive,315 allows the child or his next friend to 
gather appropriate proof of paternity in cases in which the father 
has died without acknowledging the child. The "clear and con-
vincing" standard of section 2-109 is consistent with other burdens 
of proof relating to legal relationships involving deceased per-
sons.36 Thus, it appears that the provisions of section 2-109 gov-
erning inheritance of the illegitimate child by, through, or from 
his natural father are constitutional. 
On the other hand, there may be raised grave doubts concern-
ing the constitutionality of that portion of section 2-109 relating 
to the right of a father or his kindred to inherit from or through 
his illegitimate child. The Code provides that even if paternity is 
established under section 2-109(2)(ii), the father and his kindred 
cannot inherit from or through the child "unless the father has 
openly treated the child as his, and has not refused to support the 
child."37 The rationale behind that provision seems to be to en-
courage fathers at least informally to acknowledge and support 
their illegitimate children. While this purpose may be a rational 
one under traditional equal protection analysis, it cannot stand if 
the close-scrutiny test of equal protection is applied. The Supreme 
Court has held in Skinner v. Oklahoma38 that a statute touching 
33. 391 U.S. at 76. 
34. See, e.g., Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929). 
35. See note 12 supra and accompanying text. 
36. Compare, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-5-2 (Supp. 1969) (interested party cannot 
obtain judgment against a deceased person on his own evidence unless such evidence 
is corroborated by other material evidence) with W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-ll-1 (1966) 
(interested party shall not be examined as a witness in regard to any personal trans-
action or communication between himself and a deceased except on his own behalf). 
37. UPC § 2-109(2)(ii). 
38. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
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on fundamental rights must not be underinclusive. Yet section 
2-109(2)(ii) arguably is underinclusive since it does not cut off the 
rights of all fathers who desert or fail to support their children, 
but rather cuts off the rights of only those who happen to have 
illegitimate children. Thus the constitutionality of the last clause 
of section 2-109(2)(ii) may tum on how the right to inherit is char-
acterized or on how the use of ancestry (in the sense of legitimacy) 
as a means of classification is viewed.39 If the right to inherit is 
deemed a basic civil right, or if classification based on legitimacy 
is deemed suspect-as is classification based on race-then the 
strict test of equal protection will apply,40 and the last clause of 
section 2-109(2)(ii) may not pass that test. 
3. Desirability 
If section 2-109 meets the tests of the equal protection and due 
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment, as it probably does, 
it still must accomplish a desirable distribution in order to be ap-
propriate for adoption by the various states either with or without 
the rest of the Code package. The law of intestate succession has two 
principal aims: to achieve a distribution of property at death which 
society deems fair, and to distribute property according to the 
presumed intent of the deceased.41 If a socially equitable distribu-
tion were the sole aim of intestacy statutes, the distribution plan 
based on the definition of "child" in section 2-109(2) could not be 
faulted. It seems only fair that the natural offspring of decedents 
should be the object of their bounty in the state's estate plan. Ille-
gitimate offspring are no less deserving of their natural parents' 
bounty because of a mere accident of birth than are their legitimate 
brethren. In fact, given the extent of the stigma that still attaches 
to bastardy,42 it could be argued that illegitimates may be more en-
titled to compensation in the form of inheritance than legitimate 
children, at least from the standpoint of social justice. At any rate, 
it seems clear that from the standpoint of equitable distribution the 
most desirable plan is to treat legitimates and illegitimates as nearly 
equally as possible, especially in light of the proof considerations 
that must be taken into account-and section 2-109(2) accomplishes 
this end. 
However, achieving a socially equitable distribution is only one 
of the goals of intestacy statutes; reflecting the presumed intent 
of the ordinary testator in lieu of a valid will is the other primary 
goal. With regard to this latter goal it could readily be argued 
that most decedents, especially fathers, would not wish to have 
!19. See note 16 supra. 
40. See notes 29 &: 30 supra and accompanying text. 
41. See Gray v. Rudovsky, supra note 9, at 24. 
42. See V. SMJUo, supra note 26, at 143·47. 
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their illegitimate offspring included among their heirs. But if the 
statute is designed to reflect presumed intent, it must still do so 
within constitutional limits. If the normal testator's presumed in-
tent is in fact frustrated by the provisions of section 2-109(2), it 
is clear that the fourteenth amendment requires that result. In 
Shelley v. Kraemer,43 the Supreme Court held that the equal pro-
tection clause prohibits court enforcement of restrictive covenants 
based on race. The reasoning of Shelley can be applied by analogy 
to the instant situation-a state is not allowed by statute or other 
state action to attribute a discriminatory intent to those who may 
not in fact have had such an intent.44 Given the additional fact 
that a testator who is so inclined can exclude illegitimate children 
from his estate by disinheriting them by will, there appears to be 
no reason whatever to inject a presumption of discriminatory in-
tent into the intestacy laws. Rather, the burden of discrimination 
properly lies with the testator.45 Thus, it appears that the legal-
estate plan of the Code based on the definition of "child" in section 
2-109(2) reaches a desirable result in light of both social values and 
presumed intent. 
Section 2-109(1), which relates to inheritance by adopted per-
sons, also seems to achieve a desirable disposition. That subsection 
is apparently designed to apply to three types of situations, only 
two of which deal directly with illegitimacy. The first situation 
involves the case in which the parents of a legitimate child are 
divorced, one of the parents subsequently remarries, and the new 
step-parent adopts the child. This situation, by its very nature, 
would not arise with regard to an illegitimate child. The second 
situation is the case in which one of the natural parents of a child, 
whether legitimate or illegitimate, dies, the surviving spouse re-
marries, and the new step-parent adopts the child. In such a case 
the child would only be the child of the surviving spouse and the 
step-parent, and not of the deceased natural parent. Thus, adop-
tion would cause the child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to 
lose his right to inherit through his deceased natural parent, to 
the extent that he has not already done so before the act of adop-
tion takes place. The third situation involves the case in which an 
illegitimate child is born, one of the natural parents marries a 
spouse other than the other natural parent, and such new spouse 
adopts the child. In this case, the child would inherit by, from, 
and through only his married natural parent and step-parent, not 
from the other natural parent. Similarly, the other natural parent 
43. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
44. Cf., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. !!69 (1967). 
45. An individual is free to discriminate against anyone he pleases so long as no 
state action is involved. See generally Shelley v. Kraemer, !l!l4 U.S. I (1948); Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (188!!). 
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could not inherit by, from, and through the child, at least by in-
testacy. 
Section 2-109(1), insofar as it relates to illegitimates in the sec-
ond and third situations just mentioned, appears to be desirable 
both from the standpoint of social justice and that of the presumed 
intent of the deceased. Furthermore, section 2-109(1) is not incon-
sistent with the statutory provisions presently in force in many 
states with regard to adopted children.46 At first glance, it might 
appear that section 2-109(1) fails to take adequate account of nat-
ural filial relationships in that adoption causes a child to lose his 
right to inherit by, through, or from his other natural parent.47 
On the other hand, there are persuasive reasons why an adopted 
child should not inherit by, through, or from his other natural 
parent. In the first place, any social-justice argument that could 
be made to the contrary is neutralized by the fact that the illegiti-
mate will be taking by intestacy by, through, or from someone-
namely the adopting parent as well as his or her natural-parent 
spouse. In addition, insofar as section 2-109(1) is designed to reflect 
the presumed intent of both the adopting parent and the other 
natural parent it seems to do so-surely the adopting parent would 
wish to make his adopted child the object of his bounty, and it is 
almost as likely that the other natural parent would not wish for 
his estate to be distributed to a child who has been adopted, and 
in many cases reared, by another person.48 Finally, in many adop-
tion cases, the other natural parent may not be known to the child 
-especially an illegitimate child-and it would seem to be a valid 
46. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAW ANN. § 702.86 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-30 (1968). 
47. In fact, the traditional rule in many states has been that an adopted child still 
retains his right to inherit by, from, and through his natural parents, and in some 
states this is still the rule. See, e.g., Au.. CODE tit. 27, § 5 (Supp. 1969). The trend in 
recent years, however, has been to subordinate the interest of fostering natural filial 
relationships to that of fostering unity in the adopting family. The New York experi-
ence in this regard is instructive. Until 1963, New York law, in accordance with the 
traditional rule, provided that an adopted child inherited from his natural as well as 
his adopting parents. Ch. 147, § 1, [1961] N.Y. Laws 781-82. In 1963 the law was 
changed to provide that an adopted child retained the right to inherit from his 
natural parents only when a natural parent remarried and consented to the adoption 
of the child by his or her spouse. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 117 (McKinney 1964). Finally, 
in 1966 the law was changed further to provide that "[w]hen a natural ••• parent ••• 
marries or remarries, and consents that the stepfather or stepmother may adopt such 
child, such consent shall not .•• affect the rights of such consenting spouse and such 
foster child to inherit from and through each other and the natural and adopted 
kindred of such consenting spouse." N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 117 (McKinney Supp. 
1969). In addition to fostering family unity, the effect of the present New York pro-
vision, as well as that of UPC § 2-109, is to give the adopted child the same relative 
rights that a natural child of the same parents would have. 
48. Adoption statutes and procedures generally produce a clean break between the 
natural parents and the child. Especially in the case of agency adoptions, the natural 
parents often do not know who the adopting parents are. See, e.g., Katz, Judicial and 
Statutory Trends in the Law of Adoption, 51 GEO. L.J. 64, 66-69 (1962). 
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state interest to attempt to protect the new family unit by not cre-
ating an economic incentive for the child to investigate his natural 
parentage.49 Thus, it is submitted that the Code's solution of treat-
ing an adopted child as the child of the adopting parent in place 
of the other natural parent is the best way of dealing with situa-
tions involving illegitimacy and adoption. 
B. The Impact of Section 2-109 on Other Provisions of the 
Uniform Probate Code Relating to Intestate Succession 
Section 2-109, which treats the illegitimate offspring as the 
child of the natural mother in all cases, and the child of the nat-
ural father if certain conditions of proof are met, cannot be viewed 
in a vacuum. Although that section could be severed from the rest 
of the Code, it forms an integral part of article 2 relating to intes-
tate succession and wills. As mentioned above, the general defini-
tional section of the Code in article I adopts the section 2-109 defi-
nition of "child" throughout the entire Code.50 In article 2 itself, 
the new and broader definition of "child" affects no less than fif-
teen other sections.51 It may be useful to survey some of those sec-
tions briefly to discern the over-all impact of section 2-109 on in-
heritance law and to point out certain areas where draftsmen may 
wish to adjust their planning to take the impact of section 2-109 
into account. 
The intestate share of the surviving spouse is determined by 
section 2-102.52 Since the share of the surviving spouse varies de-
pending on the existence of issue of the decedent, treating ille-
gitimates as heirs of a deceased father would change the spouse's 
49. Full integration of the adopted child into the adopting family is a major 
social objective of adoption. Lingering ties with one or both natural parents would 
seem to undermine that objective. See Katz, supra note 48. 
50. See note 21 supra and accompanying text. 
51. Naturally, since UPC § 2-109 defines "child" and since children are an essential 
beneficiary in any intestacy scheme, the substantive and procedural rules governing 
intestate succession which the UPC sets forth will be applicable to illegitimates as 
well as legitimate children. See, e.g., UPC § 2-104 (children must survive the testator 
for 120 hours in order to take an intestate share); UPC § 2-107 (halfbloods take as if 
they were of the whole blood); UPC § 2-111 (debts owed to the decedent will only 
be charged against the debtor's share); UPC § 2-801 (renunciation). Treating illegiti-
mates as children under these provisions, however, does not create any special problems 
for draftsmen. 
52. UPC § 2-102 provides: 
The intestate share of the surviving spouse is: 
(1) if there is no surviving issue or parent of the decedent, the entire intestate 
estate; 
(2) if there is no surviving issue but the decedent is survived by a parent or par-
ents, the first [$50,000), plus one-half of the balance of the intestate estate; 
(3) if there are surviving issue all of whom are issue of the surviving spouse also, 
the first [$50,000], plus one-half of the balance of the intestate estate; 
(4) if there are surviving issue one or more of whom are not issue of the surviving 
spouse, one-half of the intestate estate. 
The same analysis would apply to UPC § 2-102A for community property states, 
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share considerably, at least when the father has no legitimate 
issue. Rather than taking the whole intestate estate under sec-
tion 2-102(1) or the first 50,000 dollars plus one half of the re-
maining estate under sections 2-102(2) or (3) if illegitimates were 
not treated as heirs of the father, the widow would now take one 
half of the intestate estate under section 2-102(4). Thus, because of 
the effect that section 2-109 has on section 2-102, the married fa-
ther of illegitimate offspring who wants his wife to inherit his 
entire estate would be forced to draft a will to achieve that par-
ticular disposition. 
Section 2-10353 allocates that portion of the intestate estate 
which remains after the surviving spouse takes her share, or the 
entire estate if there is no surviving spouse. Under section 2-103(1), 
treating illegitimate children as heirs of the father will affect the 
size of the shares that pass to legitimate children. It is not diffi-
cult to imagine a case in which heirs who would otherwise take 
per capita would be relegated to taking by representation by vir-
tue of the existence of an illegitimate child of a degree closer to 
the parent, since shares are determined pursuant to section 2-106, 
relating to representation, and the illegitimate simply would be 
added to the class of heirs at the appropriate level. Similarly, ille-
gitimates can take by representation through their dead parents, 
thus creating another class of heirs in some cases, and reducing 
the per capita shares of the first degree accordingly. Perhaps even 
more important than its effect on section 2-103(1) is the possible 
effect of section 2-109 on sections 2-103(2), (3), and (4). Under those 
provisions, the share of the decedent's parents, his brothers and sis-
ters, and his grandparents respectively are all contingent on the 
absence of surviving issue. Thus, if a man died leaving an illegit-
imate son and two aged parents, his entire estate would go to the 
53. UPC § 2-103 provides: 
The part of the intestate estate not passing to the surviving spouse under Section 
2-102, or the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving spouse, passes as follows: 
{l) to the issue of the decedent; if they are all of the same degree of kinship 
to the decedent they take equally, but if of unequal degree, then those of more 
remote degree take by representation; 
(2) if there is no surviving issue, to his parent or parents equally; 
(3) if there is no surviving issue or parent, to the brothers and sisters and the 
issue of each deceased brother or sister by representation; if there is no surviving 
brother or sister, the issue of brothers and sisters take equally if they are all of 
the same degree of kinship to the decedent, but if of unequal degree then those 
of more remote degree take by representation; 
(4) if there is no surviving issue, parent or issue of a parent, but the decedent 
is survived by one or more grandparents or issue of grandparents, half of the 
estate passes to the paternal grandparents if both survive, or to the surviving 
paternal grandparent, or to the issue of the paternal grandparents if both are 
deceased, the issue taking equally if they are all of the same degree of kindship 
to the decedent, but if of unequal degree those of more remote degree take by 
representation; and the other half passes to the maternal relatives in the same 
manner; but if there be no surviving grandparent or issue of grandparent on 
either the paternal or the maternal side, the entire estate passes to the relatives 
on the other side in the same manner as the half. 
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illegitimate son. In much the same manner, treating an illegitimate 
as an heir may prevent escheat under section 2-105.64 Draftsmen must 
be especially wary of section 2-103 since the existence of illegitimate 
heirs may cause distribution of the intestate estate contrary to the 
wishes or expectations of many decedents with illegitimate off-
spring. It is now necessary to advise such persons to write a will 
rather than rely on the intestacy laws. 
Treating illegitimates as heirs of the father also has an impor-
tant effect on section 2-10866 relating to afterborn heirs. Under 
that provision, illegitimates who are conceived before a decedent's 
death but born thereafter will be heirs as if they were born dur-
ing the lifetime of the decedent. Thus, the juxtaposition of sec-
tions 2-108 and 2-109 could give rise to a spate of fraudulent 
claims by pregnant "gold diggers." In such cases the "clear and 
convincing" proof requirement for establishing paternity under 
section 2-109 should prove its usefulness. 
Section 2-109 also has an important impact on section 2-11056 
relating to advancements. Under section 2-110 an illegitimate, as 
an heir, is subject to having receipts treated as advancements in 
certain cases. The provision is sufficiently clear that support pay-
ments, for instance, would not be treated as advancements unless 
a writing to that effect can be produced. It should be noted, how-
ever, that an astute draftsman could make good use of section 2-110, 
since a father who is supporting illegitimate children in another 
household may wish to designate such support payments as ad-
vancements in order to make what he feels to be an equitable dis-
tribution of his estate. Section 2-110 would seem to allow him to 
make such a designation. 
The effect of section 2-109 on section 2-11251 dealing with 
alienage could also prove to be important and lead to some diffi-
culties, since alien illegitimates would be entitled to take as heirs 
under that provision. In light of the number of American service-
men and travelers going abroad each year, it is not unlikely that 
54. UPC § 2-105 provides: "If there is no taker under the provisions of this 
Article, the intestate estate passes to the [state]." 
55. UPC § 2-108 provides: "Relatives of the decedent conceived before his death 
but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent." 
56. UPC § 2-II0 provides: 
If a person dies intestate as to all his estate, property which he gave in his 
lifetime to an heir is treated as an advancement against the latter's share of the 
estate only if declared in a contemporaneous writing by the decedent or acknowl-
edged in writing by the heir to be an advancement. For this purpose the property 
advanced is valued as of the time the heir came into possession or enjoyment of 
the property or as of the time of death of the decedent, whichever first occurs. 
If the recipient of the property fails to survive the decedent, the property is 
not taken into account in computing the intestate share to be received by the 
recipient's issue, unless the declaration or acknowledgment provides otherwise. 
57. UPC § 2-ll2 provides: "No person is disqualified to take as an heir because 
he or a person through whom he claims is or has been an alien." 
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such servicemen and travelers father a number of alien illegitimate 
children.158 However, it seems doubtful that many alien illegiti-
mates will be able to sustain the "clear and convincing" proof 
burden of section 2-109(2)(ii). Moreover, international conflict-of-
laws problems could arise in this area regarding choice of law, and 
could be especially troublesome if the child is born in a country 
that does not recognize paternity actions. 
It should be noted that section 2-109 will also affect provisions 
of the Code other than those dealing strictly with intestate succes-
sion, since on the basis of that section, illegitimates may be able to 
take against a valid will in certain instances. For example, an ille-
gitimate child could be a pretermitted heir under section 2-30259 
just as a legitimate child could be. Section 2-302 could present the 
draftsman with substantial problems since that section not only 
presumes the existence of a will but further presumes that the 
omission of an afterborn illegitimate child in that will was unin-
tentional, except in enumerated circumstances. If an afterborn ille-
gitimate child is deemed to be a pretermitted heir, he is entitled 
to take against the will the value which he would have received 
if the testator had died intestate. Furthermore, under section 2-
302(b) an illegitimate child is entitled to a like share if the testator 
omitted him from his will in the belief that the child was dead. 
It may be that, in light of the relationship between sections 2-109 
and 2-302, draftsmen will insert in many wills a provision to the 
effect that afterborn illegitimate children are purposely excluded 
from the testator's will, in order to make certain the circle of heirs 
in a given estate plan. This procedure would also provide a solution 
to the pregnant "gold digger" problem, alluded to earlier,60 which 
might arise in this context as well. 
Illegitimates may also be able to take the homestead allowance, 
exempt-property allowance, and family allowance against a will 
58. See, e.g., V. SAARio, supra note 26, at 15. 
59. UPC § 2-302 provides: 
(a) If a testator fails to provide in his will for any of his children born or 
adopted after the execution of his will, the omitted child receives a share in the 
estate equal in value to that which he would have received if the testator had 
died intestate unless: 
(I) it appears from the will that the omission was intentional; 
(2) when the will was executed the testator had one or more children and 
devised substantially all his estate to the other parent of the omitted child; or 
(3) the testator provided for the child by transfer outside the will and the 
intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by 
statements of the testator or from the amount of the transfer or other evidence. 
(b) If at the time of execution of the will the testator fails to provide in his 
will for a living child solely because he believes the child to be dead, the child 
receives a share in the estate equal in value to that which he would have re-
ceived if the testator had died intestate. 
(c) In satisfying a share provided by this section, the devises made by the will 
abate as provided in Section 3-902. 
60. See text following note 55 supra. 
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pursuant to sections 2-401,61 2-402,62 and 2-40363 respectively. Un-
der section 2-401, if there is no surviving spouse, the minor or 
dependent illegitimate children have a right to share the home-
stead allowance of 5,000 dollars with other legitimate minor or 
dependent children. Thus, illegitimate children may be entitled 
to a homestead allowance when there otherwise would be none, 
as in the ca~e in which a single man who was the father of a minor 
illegitimate child disposed of his entire estate by will. Similarly, un-
der section 2-402 an illegitimate child is entitled to share in the 
exempt-property allowance for an estate up to a total of 3,500 dollars 
if there is no surviving spouse. In contrast to the homestead allow-
ance, in order to be entitled to the exempt-property allowance ille-
gitimates need not be minors or dependent on the decedent. Fur-
61. UPC § 2-401 provides: 
A surviving spouse of a decedent who was domiciled in this state is entitled to 
a homestead allowance of [$5,000]. If there is no surviving spouse, each minor 
child and each dependent child of the decedent is entitled to a homestead allow-
ance amounting to [$5,000] divided by the number of minor and dependent chil-
dren of the decedent. The homestead allowance is exempt from and has priority 
over all claims against the estate. Homestead allowance is in addition to any 
share passing to the surviving spouse or minor or dependent child by the will 
of the decedent unless othenvise provided, by intestate succession or by way of 
elective share. 
62. UPC § 2-402 provides: 
In addition to the homestead allowance, the surviving spouse of a decedent 
who was domiciled in this state is entitled from the estate to value not exceeding 
$3,500 in excess of any security interests therein in household furniture, auto-
mobiles, furnishings, appliances and personal effects. If there is no surviving 
spouse, children of the decedent are entitled jointly to the same value. If 
encumbered chattels are selected and if the value in excess of security interests, 
plus that of other exempt property, is less than $3,500, or if there is not $3,500 
worth of exempt property in the estate, the spouse or children are entitled to 
other assets of the estate, if any, to the extent necessary to make up the $3,500 
value. Rights to exempt property and assets needed to make up a deficiency of 
exempt property have priority over all claims against the estate, except that the 
right to any assets to make up a deficiency of exempt property shall abate as 
necessary to permit prior payment of homestead allowance and family allowance. 
These rights are in addition to any benefit or share passing to the surviving spouse 
or children by the will of the decedent unless othenvise provided, by intestate 
succession, or by way of elective share. 
63. UPC § 2-403 provides: 
In addition to the right to homestead allowance and exempt property, if the 
decedent was domiciled in this state, the surviving spouse and minor children 
whom the decedent was obligated to support and children who were in fact being 
supported by him are entitled to a reasonable allowance in money out of the 
estate for their maintenance during the period of administration, which allowance 
may not continue for longer than one year if the estate is inadequate to discharge 
allowed claims. The allowance may be paid as a lump sum or in periodic install-
ments. It is payable to the surviving spouse, if living, for the use of the surviving 
spouse and minor and dependent children; otherwise to the children, or persons 
having their care and custody; but in case any minor child or dependent child is 
not living with the surviving spouse, the allowance may be made partially to the 
child or his guardian or other person having his care and custody, and partially 
to the spouse, as their needs may appear. The family allowance is exempt from 
and has priority over all claims but not over the homestead allowance. 
The family allowance is not chargeable against any benefit or share passing to 
the surviving spouse or children by the will of the decedent unless otherwise 
provided, . by intestate succession, or by way of elective share. The death of any 
person entitled to family allowance terminates his right to allowances not yet paid. 
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thermore, illegitimates would be able to take advantage of the 
family-allowance provision of section 2-403 up to a total of 6,000 
dollars during the period of administration of the estate. If the 
spouse survives, the family allowance is paid to her (or him) for the 
care of herself and the children living with her. But if the minor 
or dependent illegitimate child is not living with the surviving 
spouse, the allowance is apportioned between such spouse and such 
child. This situation would be fairly common in cases in which the 
parents of the illegitimate child do not live together. If no spouse 
survives, the family allowance is paid directly to children who 
qualify. It should be noted that the homestead, exempt-property, 
and family allowances all are created by statute and, as such, entitle 
qualified persons to take against the will regardless of a testator's 
contrary intent. 
From this brief survey of other relevant Code sections to which 
section 2-109 relates, it is clear that the repercussions of treating 
illegitimates as heirs of the natural parents whenever possible can 
have a profound effect on the distribution of estates. Thus, estate 
planners must be alert to the implications of section 2-109 in or-
der to develop secure estate plans. Section 2-109 assures that if a 
testator wishes to discriminate against his illegitimate offspring, 
the law will not accomplish that task for him. 
III. THE ILLEGITIMATE AND THE CLASS GIFT TO CHILDREN 
UNDER THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
Part 6 of article 2 of the Code deals with rules of construction 
for wills and contains the other crucial Code provision dealing with 
illegitimates-section 2-611. As the general comment to part 6 sug-
gests, "all of the 'rules' set forth yield to a contrary intent expressed 
in the will and are therefore merely presumptions."64 Nonetheless, 
rules of construction are an important aspect of inheritance law, 
for all too often testators fail to make clear their intentions in a 
will, and courts need some guidance in the form of legal presump-
tions in construing wills. Section 2-6 I 1 is that rule of construction 
which defines "child" in a class-gift terminology. That section pro-
vides that: 
Halfbloods, adopted persons, and persons born out of wedlock are 
included in class gift terminology and terms of relationship in 
accordance with rules for determining relationships for purposes of 
intestate succession, but a person born out of wedlock is not treated 
as the child of the father unless the person is openly and notoriously 
so treated by the father. 65 
64. UPC art. 2, pt. 6, general comment. 
65. UPC § 2-611. 
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Thus, section 2-61166 adopts the basic formula of section 2-109 
and adds another condition that the illegitimate must fulfill before 
he can be presumed to take under a bequest to children. The im-
port of the provision is clear: the illegitimate child will always be 
included in a bequest to "children" by the mother; on the other 
hand, the same illegitimate child will only be included in a bequest 
to "children" by the father if the illegitimate can first establish 
paternity under section 2-109 and if the father openly and notori-
ously treats the child as his own. Section 2-611 by its terms only 
requires that an illegitimate be treated openly and notoriously as 
the child of the father in order to be included under a class gift 
to children. But the definition of "child" as used in section 2-611 
comes from section 1-201(3) which extends the section 2-109 defi-
nition of "child" throughout the Code.67 Thus, it seems that an 
illegitimate must satisfy requirements of both sections 2-109 and 
2-611 in order to be included in a class gift to children. 
Since a statutory presumption such as that found in section 2-611 
constitutes state action no less than judicial enforcement of a re-
strictive covenant,68 such a presumption must stand up to consti-
tutional scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment. Section 2-611 
poses no due process problems since it creates only a rebuttable 
presumption.69 It may, however, be constitutionally suspect under 
the equal protection clause. The rationale behind the presumption 
in section 2-611 seems to be the "family-unit" theory, 70 which as-
sumes that a testator normally wishes his bounty, to pass to those 
within his family unit. As a general rule, the family-unit theory 
may be factually supportable, and may form a good basis for at-
tempting to discern the actual intent of most testators. But unfor-
tunately the "open and notorious" requirement of section 2-611 
represents an imprecise application of the family-unit doctrine 
in that it requires too heavy a burden of proof from too small a 
group of people. One problem with section 2-611 is that only ille-
gitimates need show open and notorious treatment by the father. 
If the provision is meant to foster the family-unit theory, why 
should not such a showing be required from all of a testator's chil-
dren, legitimate and illegitimate alike? If a testator deserts both 
legitimate and illegitimate children, it would not be reasonable to 
allow only the legitimate children to take under a bequest to "chil-
dren" when neither group actually has been treated as children by 
the father. On the other hand, a showing that the testator deserted 
66. See also UPC § 3-101 which provides that the UPC will apply to wills drafted 
before the UPC becomes effective. 
67. See note 21 supra and accompanying text. 
68. See text accompanying note 43 supra. 
69. See note 34 supra. 
70. See Gray &: Rudovsky, supra note 9. 
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all his children may be sufficient to rebut the presumption in sec-
tion 2-611 against the illegitimate children. Thus, in large measure, 
the constitutionality and desirability of section 2-611 turns on the 
type and quantum of evidence that is required by a court to rebut 
the presumption contained therein. 
Assuming that section 2-611 is neither undesirable nor uncon-
stitutional even though it discriminates on the basis of legitimacy, 
one further problem remains with the formulation of that section. 
The requirement that the father treat the illegitimate as his child 
"openly and notoriously" in order for the child to be deemed an 
heir under a bequest to children may be challenged from the stand-
point of desirability, not on the basis of any discrimination, but 
rather on its face as too strict a standard. It is arguable that such a 
requirement may be unrealistic since the imposition of that require-
ment may assume that the social stigma attached to bastardy has 
disappeared to a greater extent than it actually has.71 In today's world 
it does not seem unlikely that a father might love and willingly sup-
port an illegitimate child and still not treat him as his own "openly 
and notoriously." Social convention is still too potent a force for 
many people openly to admit paternity of a bastard. Thus, a lesser 
showing of family unity than "open and notorious" treatment as a 
child would probably be more desirable under section 2-611. Clearly 
some recognition by the father of the parent-child relationship 
should be required. However, since the facts of each case are likely 
to be quite varied, it would be preferable to treat this issue on a 
case-by-case basis in order to determine the actual intent of the 
father, rather than to impose a strict per se standard such as the 
"open and notorious" requirement. Moreover, it must be remem-
bered that since section 2-611 raises only a rebuttable presumption, 
testators are free explicitly to define "children" in their wills to in-
clude or exclude illegitimates as they see fit. 
Thus it appears that although section 2-611 does create a clas-
sification based on illegitimacy, the discrimination it fosters is 
probably not so unreasonable as to violate the equal protection 
clause. Insofar as the presumption of section 2-611 has a factual basis, 
allows a court to discern the testator's actual intent in each case, and 
is rebuttable, it should be upheld in the courts. On the other hand, 
the standard of the presumption could be improved by modifying 
the "open and notorious" requirement to one which recognizes 
that many fathers may be unwilling, for a variety of social reasons, 
openly to acknowledge illegitimate children. Alternatively, the 
"open and notorious" requirement or a modification thereof could 
be applied to legitimate children as well in order to extend the 
family-unit theory to its logical limit. 
71. See V. SMRIO, supra note 26, at 143-47. 
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IV. CONCLUSION
Illegitimacy has always been a fact of life in civilized society.
So, too, has bastardy carried with it a special social stigma. But
modem society has been gradually eliminating its outworn taboos.
At the same time, the number of illegitimate births continues
to rise 2 as illegitimacy proves to be more socially acceptable.
In light of the large number of illegitimate children born in the
United States every year,73 American law, including inheritance
law, can no longer afford to treat the bastard as filius nullius solely
on account of an accident of birth. The bastard must be welcomed
into society on a level of parity with his legitimate brothers. The
provisions of the Uniform Probate Code dealing with illegitimates
make a solid attempt to achieve that level of parity in the field of
inheritance law. With only minor modifications necessary to avoid
possible constitutional problems, the provisions of the Code appear
to establish an appropriate model for reform in this important
area, whether they be adopted in conjunction with the rest of the
Uniform Probate Code or grafted onto an existing state probate
system.
72. See Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 477 (1967).
73. In 1963 there were 259,400 illegitimate live births in the United States. U.S.
CENsus BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr oF THE UNrrED STATES 47, 51 (1965).
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